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Abstract 
 
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) is considered as one of the last defense mechanisms for any 
organization. NIDS can be broadly classified into two approaches: misuse-based detection and anomaly-
based detection. Misuse-based intrusion detection builds a database of the well-defined patterns of the 
attacks that exploit weaknesses in systems and network protocols, and uses that database to identify the 
intrusions. Although this approach can detect all the attacks included in the database, it leads to false 
negative errors where any new attack not included in that database can’t be detected. The other approach is 
the anomaly-based NIDS which is developed to emulate the Human Immune System (HIS) and overcome 
the limitation of the misuse-based approach. The anomaly-based detection approach is based on Negative 
Selection (NS) mechanism. NS is based on building a database of the normal self patterns, and identifying 
any pattern not included in that database as a non-self pattern and hence the intrusion is detected. 
Unfortunately, NS concept has also its drawbacks. Although any attack pattern can be detected as a non-
self pattern and this leads to low false negative rate, non-self patterns would not necessarily indicate the 
existence of intrusions. So, NS has a high false positive error rate caused from that assumption. Danger 
Theory (DT) is a new concept in HIS, which shows that the response mechanism in HIS is more complicated 
and beyond the simple NS concept. So, is it possible to utilize the DT to minimize the high false positive 
detection rate of NIDS? This paper answers this question by developing a prototype for NIDS based on DT 
and evaluating that prototype using DARPA99 Intrusion Detection dataset.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
Information is one of the main assets of any organization which is 
essential to its continuity. Consequently, information security is 
very important to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of the information. Many systems and tools are used to 
achieve the requirements of the information security and to prevent 
information systems from any possible incidents. Despite different 
protection mechanisms are used, it is nearly impossible to have a 
completely secured system [1]. Sophisticated security systems can 
be used to achieve the information security requirements, but these 
systems may be under threat due to vulnerabilities or their 
misconfiguration. As a result, these vulnerabilities or 
misconfiguration may be exploited by intruders to implement their 
attacks. So, intrusion detection is considered as the last defense 
mechanism of the security systems of any organization. 
  According to [2], the intrusion can be defined as any set of 
actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality or 
availability of a resource. To detect the existence of intrusions, 
huge size of data needs to be examined. Medium and large 
networks have huge number of network activities, which lead to 
generate very big log files, which make human inspection for those 
log files impossible [3]. So, the solution is to use the automatic 
detection systems where this type of systems is called Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS). In [4], IDS are defined as software 
systems which are designed to identify and prevent the misuse of 
computer networks and systems. So, the purpose of IDS is to 
discover any attack overcame the security systems. 
  Based on the location, IDS can be classified into host-based 
IDS (HIDS) and network-based IDS (NIDS). The first category 
depends on gathering data from the host such as system logs, 
application logs, system processes information, and so on. The 
other category depends on analyzing statistics about the network 
packets captured by a network sniffer, such as number of packets 
sent/received for each device in the network, number of ICMP 
packets sent/received for each device, the special flags found in the 
network packets and so on. For these two categories, NIDS has the 
advantage of the ability to detect attacks which involve multiple 
hosts. 
  According to [4], IDS can be classified into two approaches: 
misuse-based detection and anomaly-based detection. The two 
approaches are discussed in the following sections. 
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1.1  Misuse-based Detection 
 
In this approach, the well-defined patterns of the attacks that exploit 
weaknesses in system and application software are used to identify 
the intrusions [5]. These patterns were encoded in advance, saved 
in a database and used to match against the working environment 
to detect intrusion [5]. Although any attack saved in the database 
can be detected efficiently, new attacking techniques can’t be 
detected which leads to the so-called “false negative error”. So, by 
classifying the examined patterns into safe self patterns and unsafe 
non-self patterns, a false negative error occurs when a non-self 
pattern is classified as safe pattern [6].Therefore, for this approach, 
the database must be constantly updated by adding the signatures 
of the new attacks [7]. The nature of current and future threats in 
conjunction with ever larger IT systems urgently requires the 
development of automated and adaptive defensive tools [4]. Hence, 
there is a need to improve IDS techniques to face the new 
challenges. 
 
1.2  Anomaly-based Detection 
 
Anomaly-based IDS were developed to emulate the Human 
Immune System (HIS). HIS protects the body against damage from 
an extremely large number of harmful bacteria, viruses and fungi, 
termed pathogens. According to [4], HIS can do this protection 
without prior knowledge of the structure of these pathogens. Since 
HIS can detect and defend against harmful and previously unseen 
invaders, so can a similar system be built for our computers? [4]. 
Hence, IDS were built using the anomaly-based detection approach 
to detect previously unknown intrusions. The anomaly-based 
detection approach is built using the Negative Selection (NS) 
concept which was noticed in the HIS. NS does not define specific 
harmful cells to be detected and thus it allows the HIS to be able to 
detect previously unseen harmful cells [4]. In contrast, NS concept 
depends on differentiating between self and non-self cells by 
identifying the self group which contains all the self cells, and 
anything else doesn’t belong to the self group is considered as non-
self cells. Applying this concept leads to create artificial systems 
that have the ability to differentiate between self and non-self 
pattern: where self could be defined as many things, such as, 
normal user events, normal network traffic, and so on [8]. So, the 
anomaly-based detection approach bases its decisions on a profile 
of normal network or system behavior, and any event that does not 
conform to this profile is considered anomalous [4]. 
  Stephanie Forrest et al. [9] were one of the first researchers to 
propose a novel NS algorithm for computer. Their algorithm 
consists of two phases: detectors generation phase, and monitoring 
phase. In the first phase, random detectors will be generated, where 
each detector represents a binary string. For the random generated 
detectors, any detector matches the protected data - which are also 
binary strings - will be eliminated. At the end of this phase, the 
detectors which don’t match the protected data will remain, and 
these detectors will be used later in the monitoring phase. In the 
second phase of the algorithm, the protected data is monitored by 
matching it with the detectors. If a detector is activated by matching 
the protected data, this means that a change has happened. To test 
the efficiency of their approach, they used an executable .com file 
which represented the self data to be protected. Their test showed a 
100% detection rate by using 125 detectors when the protected self 
file encoded by 655 binary strings of 32-bits long. 
  In [6], LISYS is a NIDS developed by Hofmeyr and Forrest 
which employs the NS algorithm. It examines TCP connections and 
classifies them as normal and abnormal connections. They 
explained the NS concept by a universe of binary strings, U, which 
is partitioned into two disjoint subsets: self subset, S, and non-self 
subset, N. So, for any arbitrary string, the task of the LISYS is to 
classify it as normal (belongs to S) or anomalous (belongs to N). 
They also showed that there are two types of discrimination errors: 
false positive and false negative. A false positive error occurs when 
a self string is classified as anomalous, where a false negative 
occurs when a non-self string is classified as normal. LISYS 
defines the self data of the system (network traffic) as a ‘datapath 
triple’ which consists of the source IP address, destination IP 
address, and the TCP service (port), such that each ‘datapath triple’ 
represents a connection between two computers. This ‘datapath 
triple’ represents a string in the universe of the system. So, the self 
set consists of all the normal connections occurred during the data 
collection period. LISYS was implemented and tested using real 
data collected on a subnet of 50 computers and this data was 
collected over 50 days with a total of 1.5 million TCP connections. 
The testing showed promising results, especially that LISYS could 
detect all the seven attacks implemented during the test. However, 
according to [4], the limited input data used in testing LISYS 
suggests that future research may be necessary to evaluate whether 
LYSIS is able to detect more diverse intrusions then those used in 
that test. 
  In [10], Computer Virus Immune System (CVIS) was 
developed by Paul K. Harmer et al. as a part of Computer Defense 
Immune System. CVIS is based on NS technique, and it was tested 
on the TIMID virus which infects the .com files. The result of the 
test showed that CVIS has a detection rate up to 89%. The test also 
discovered a serious problem NS algorithm suffers from, which is 
the scalability problem. The test showed that CVIS needs 
approximately 1.05 years to generate the detectors for self data with 
8 gigabytes in size which was used in the test. 
  In [11] and [12], the authors proposed using the Genetic 
algorithms (GA) to produce the NS detectors. In their tests, they 
used a subset of the 1999 Lincoln Labs tcpdump datasets, and they 
got a detection rate of 85%. Based on their tests, they concluded 
that their promising results show that it is possible to use NS in 
IDS. 
  In [13], the Immuno-Fuzzy approach was used. This approach 
depends on generating NS detectors represented by fuzzy rules. 
The benefit of using fuzzy logic is to provide better definition of 
the boundary between the normal and abnormal space, and this 
leads to increase the accuracy in solving the anomaly-based 
detection problems. Their experiment showed better detection rate 
as compared with the different approaches, and it showed also 
minimizing in the number of detectors needed for the detection 
process. 
  Unfortunately, NS approach has its drawbacks. Non-self 
patterns would not necessarily indicate intrusions and thus a high 
false positive error rate caused from this assumption is perhaps the 
inevitable limit of the NS algorithm [4]. That means anomaly-based 
systems are able to detect novel attacks but currently produce a 
large number of false positives [4]. A false positive occurs when a 
self pattern is classified as anomalous. According to [6], the 
important research issue for IDS is how to find true intrusion alerts 
from thousands alerts generated. This shows the inability of 
anomaly-based techniques to cope adequately with the fact that in 
the real world normal, legitimate computer network and system 
usage patterns change over time, meaning that any profile of 
normal behavior also needs to be dynamic [8]. 
 
1.3  Danger Theory (DT) 
 
DT is a new concept in HIS, which shows that the response 
mechanism in the HIS is more complicated and beyond the simple 
NS concept. “The central idea in the DT is that the immune system 
does not respond to non-self but to danger. Thus, just like the self-
non-self theories, it fundamentally supports the need for 
discrimination. However, it differs in the answer to what should be 
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responded to. Instead of responding to foreignness, the immune 
system reacts to danger” [14]. “The DT debates this and argues that 
there must be discrimination happening that goes beyond the self 
non-self distinction. It could therefore be proposed that it is not the 
‘foreignness’ of the invaders that is important for immune 
recognition, but the relative ‘danger’ of these invaders. For 
instance, there is no immune reaction to foreign bacteria in the gut 
or to food. Conversely, some auto-reactive processes exist, e.g. 
against self-molecules expressed by stressed cells” [15]. DT 
suggests that the immune system reacts to threats based on the 
correlation of various (danger) signals [15]. Danger signals 
released as a result of dying cells indicate damage, and stimulate 
the immune system [7]. According to [14], although DT is not 
complete, and there are still some doubts about its detailed 
mechanism, it contains enough interesting ideas to be utilized in 
building the Artificial Immune Systems. 
  As result, many researcher trend to apply the DT to the 
Artificial Immune System. It is believed that applying ideas from 
the DT can help building better Artificial Immune Systems by 
providing a different way of grounding and removing the necessity 
to map self or non-self [14]. In particular, the DT provides a way 
of grounding the response, i.e. linking it directly to the attacker and 
it removes the necessity to map self or non-self [14]. DT can be 
used to help in improving the detection efficiency and accuracy of 
IDS. For the application of the DT to computer security, IDS can 
reduce the false positive and false negative by focusing on threats 
[16]. 
  In [17], Burgess developed Cfengine as a system which aims 
to automatically configure large numbers of systems on a 
heterogeneous network with an arbitrary degree of variety in the 
configuration. After a human administrator initially specifies 
configuration policies at a very general level using an expert system 
shell, Cfengine automatically monitors the state of each system and 
adapts initially specified generic policies to be more locally 
optimized. This change immediately triggers the modification of 
other policies affecting different hosts. The new policy reflects a 
new environment and other hosts can optimize their own policies. 
An agent framework was used to develop Cfengine, employing an 
agent-based expert system that locally optimizes the maintenance 
of each local host in a distributed environment. The initial 
maintenance policy indicates the abstract classes of machines and 
resources in a network, which is based on several attributes, such 
as OS, network domain, address and any scheme defined by a user. 
When Cfengine runs, it applies a configuration policy suitable for 
the classes of monitoring hosts and resources. The class based 
generic policy is then locally optimized as Cfengine continues to 
change the policy depending on what is locally observed. Burgess 
also formally showed by using game theory that this kind of 
repeated application of policy change can converge to the stable 
equilibrium of a local policy. Once the convergent state is reached, 
Cfengine becomes passive or quiescent until the next considerable 
anomaly arises. This phenomenon was understood as a form of 
system homeostasis. 
  The next development of Cfengine added several new features 
together with a more sophisticated anomaly-based detection 
engine. Within the Cfengine framework, a statistical filter using a 
time-series prediction detects the significance of deviation. The 
symbolic content of observed events determines how the system 
should respond, and is based on a locally optimized policy. Burgess 
saw a statistical anomaly as a danger signal, and claimed that only 
the content of observed events characterizes the internal degree of 
the signal. In order to increase the scalability of the anomaly-based 
detection component, it incrementally updates the mean and 
variance of the sampled events. These events are the number of 
users, the number of processes, average utilization of the system 
(load average), number of incoming and outgoing connections 
based on each service, and the numerical characteristics of 
incoming and outgoing packets. 
  DCA was first introduced by Greensmith et al. [18]. DCA tries 
to model the behaviors of DC in HIS. In DCA, input signals are 
categorized as PAMPs P, Danger Signals D, Safe Signals S, and 
Inflammatory Cytokines IC. Each one of these inputs is expressed 
as a concentration C. The input signals are transformed to output 
concentrations of costimulatory molecules csm, semi-mature DC 
cytokines semi, and mature DC cytokines mat. The signal 
processing function is shown in the following equation, and the 
weighting values for the signal processing function are shown in 
Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1  The weighting values for the signal processing function of DCA 
([18]) 
 
W csm semi mat 
PAMPs (P) 2 0 2 
Danger Signals (D) 1 0 1 
Safe Signals (S) 2 3 -3 
 
 
  To use this algorithm, the input signals have to be specified 
such that PAMPs are signals that are known to be pathogenic, Safe 
Signals are signals that are known to be normal, Danger Signals are 
signals that may indicate a change in behavior, and Inflammatory 
Cytokines are signals that amplify the effects of the other signals. 
  In [7], Greensmith and Uwe Aickelin implemented the DCA 
for outgoing port scan detection using SYN scan. TCP SYN scan 
is a commonly used type of scan, which leaves no trace in the 
normal system logs. The SYN scan itself is used to determine 
which ports are open and which services are running on specified 
hosts. Unlike the default TCP Connect scan, the SYN scan leaves 
no trace in normal system logs, as the TCP ‘3-way handshake’ is 
left incomplete. SYN scans involve sending TCP packets to IP 
addresses specified to be scanned. The scanning machine sends a 
SYN packet to each address, and uses the information retrieved 
from the scanned remote machines to characterize the network. If 
a SYN packet is sent to a closed port, the remote machine responds 
by sending a TCP reset (RST) packet back to the scanning machine. 
Conversely, if the port is open, the remote machine responds with 
a TCP SYN-ACK packet. The scanning machine then terminates 
the potential TCP connection by sending a RST packet to the 
remote machine. As the 3 way handshake is not completed, no 
actual connection is made to the remote machine. 
  To implement their system, the input signals of DC were 
selected to meet the requirements of the DCA. So, the PAMPS 
which are considered as an abnormal behavior are represented by 
number of ICMP ‘destination unreachable’ error messages received 
per second. Scanning IP addresses which are not attached to a 
running machine or machines which are prevented by a firewall 
against ICMP packets generate these error messages. Addition 
PAMPs signal used in this system was the number of TCP reset 
packets sent and received per second. For Danger signals, they are 
represented by the number of packets sent per second. For Safe 
signals, the low rate of change of packet sending is selected. For 
Inflammation signals which are used to amplify the effects of the 
other signals, the number of users logged to the system remotely is 
chosen. The results of their experiments showed that the DCA is 
capable of performing scan detection under difficult conditions. 
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In [19], Jungwon Kim et al. proposed a system to detect the 
execution of malicious code using the DCA. The analysis of system 
calls is one method employed by anomaly detection systems to 
recognize malicious code execution. Malicious code execution 
through the exploitation of software vulnerabilities can allow an 
intruder to compromise a host running the software. The running of 
any process on a machine generates system calls, providing 
interaction between application, operating system and hardware. 
So, analysis of the system calls made by a process, through the 
verification of system call usage, can expose the execution of 
malicious code. Research in this field usually utilizes the building 
of system call profiles during the legitimate operation of monitored 
programs. So, these profiles are used in the detection process, such 
that any syscall sequences or arguments that do not match the 
previously generated ‘normal’ profiles are considered as a sign of 
the system comprising. Although promising results can be achieved 
with this approach, it produces high rates of false positive errors, 
and this may arise from the fact that the environment comprising 
the ‘system’ is largely ignored. 
  In the proposed system, PAMPS are represented by violations 
of security policies created by a system call checker such as 
‘Systrace’, which represent signature based signals, like proteins 
that come from pathogenic sources in human body. For the danger 
signals, they are represented by the behavior of the process, such 
that the deviations in the behavior increase the level of danger 
within the system. On the other hand, the continuous normal 
behavior of the processes generates safe signals. For the 
Inflammatory cytokines which are not enough to initiate full DC 
maturation, but have the amplifying effect to the other signals, it 
was suggested to map them to the general behavior of the host 
machine such as the system load average. 
  According to [20] and [21], statistical analysis can be 
implemented for networks traffic, and this analysis can detect the 
status of the monitored network. The statistical data may show 
changes in the network traffic patterns and may show also the 
stability of the network. The changes may represented by changes 
in transmitting rate, high rate of concurrent open connections of 
specific machines in the monitored network and so on. This 
statistical data can also detect anomalies in the network traffic, but 
as discussed before, the existence of anomalies of the network 
traffic doesn’t not necessary mean the existence of intrusions. So 
this statistical data represents a rich source to sense the behaviors 
of the network traffic and can be utilized in developing a network 
intrusion detection prototype based on the DT which can make a 
right balance between the effects of the different sensed signals to 
produce a correct detection decision. 
 
 
2.0  NIDS USING DT 
 
NIDS using anomaly-based detection mechanism based on NS 
approach has an advantage on misuse-based detection by 
minimizing the false negative rate. The reason for that is anomaly-
based detection mechanism using NS differentiates between self 
and non-self patterns by identifying the self patterns group and 
classifying anything else as non-self pattern. This leads to 
minimizing the false negative rate because unknown attacks are 
classified as non-self pattern and then they are detected efficiently. 
From the other side, it is not necessary that any non-self pattern is 
absolutely intrusion, and this leads to a high false positive rate. So, 
is it possible to minimize the high false positive detection rate by 
using DT to achieve this goal? 
  Our aim is to develop a network intrusion detection prototype 
based on DT to minimize the high false positive rate produced by 
the current generation of NIDS which are built on the NS concept. 
The design of the prototype is shown Figure 1 consists of: network 
packets sniffer, preprocessor, PAMP signal sensor, safe signal 
sensor, danger signal processor, inflammation signal sensor, 
signals processor, and alert and events logger. These components 
are described in the following sections. 
 
Figure 1  Prototype design 
 
 
2.1  Network Packet Sniffer 
 
The Network Packets Sniffer is that component which captures the 
network packets passing through a network node, and then dumps 
those packets to a file to be examined later. The packets written to 
the file has the common and popular tcpdump packet format. 
 
2.2  Preprocessor 
 
For the monitoring process, the raw data of the network packets 
needs some preprocessing, such as normalization and so on. The 
preprocessor component was designed and developed to achieve 
this task. 
 
2.3  PAMP Signal Sensor 
 
PAMP signal represents the existence of abnormal or non-self 
objects in the monitored environment. So, in the network intrusion 
detection context, the existence of abnormal or non-self objects 
means the existence of network connections which are not appeared 
in the training phase. Many studies were done to find good criteria 
to classify the network connections to self and non-self 
connections. So, the classification of the network connections 
based on their content or payload is selected to represent the 
criterion of the classification process. The selection of this criterion 
is based on the fact that HIS (which DT is derived from) senses the 
PAMP signal in the human body by detecting the existence of 
foreign (non-self) cells, and this detection process is done by the 
dendritic cells which have trained to recognize the self cells of the 
human body. So, in case of facing cells not recognized by the 
dendritic cells, this leads to issue the PAMP signal by the dendritic 
cells. The same scenario was applied in the experimental as shown 
in the next section. In the training phase of the prototype, a dataset 
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of normal network connections is provided to our prototype, and 
our prototype analyzes, model and learn the payload patterns of the 
normal connections. These patterns can be modeled as the medium 
and variance values of the bytes histogram of the normal 
connections payload. So, in the detection process, the bytes 
histogram of the examined connection is calculated and compared 
to the predefined models, and the value of the PAMP signal for the 
examined connection will represent the distance between the bytes 
histogram of the examined connection and the predefined models 
of bytes histogram which is calculated based on the medium and 
variance values saved in the network connections models. 
 
2.4  Safe Signal Sensor 
 
In the DT, the safe signal represents the stability and the normality 
of the examined connection and it is used to balance the impact of 
the danger and PAMP signals in the detection process. So, this 
signal is required to reflect the level of normality and stability of 
the network performance and behavior which in turn means the 
safety of the examined connection. For out prototype, three features 
extracted for each connection used to contribute in making the 
concentration of the safe signal of the connection. The first feature 
is the distance between the payload histogram of the connection 
and the histogram of the executable files contents. This feature will 
contribute to the safe concentration of the connection by producing 
high values when the histogram of the connection payload is far 
from the histogram of the executable file which is not necessarily 
means the existence of attack, but at least the connection who has 
payload similar to the histogram of the executable files has the 
possibility to be part of an attack. So, while the payload histogram 
of the connection is far from the histogram of the executable files, 
then this means some kind of confidence that the examined 
connection is not part of an attack. 
  The second feature used to construct the safe concentration of 
the network connections is the distance between the service request 
rate of the connection measured during the connection period and 
the mean value of the connections of the same service learned in 
the training phase. This feature measures the level of the stability 
of the request size of the service which the current connection 
belongs to. As long as the request rate of the service over the whole 
network is normal and similar to the normal circumstances, this 
increases the safe concentration of the connection, and once the 
service request changes, this minimizes the value of the safe 
concentration of the connection. 
  The third feature is the deviation rate in the network payload. 
When the rate of the network payload deviation is high, it means 
that the network is not stable, and this minimizes the safety of the 
examined connection. On the other hand, when the rate of the 
network payload deviation is low, this can give the impression that 
the network is stable and there is no attack implemented in that 
moment. So, the gradual deviation in the network connections 
statistics is normal and happens all the time. In contrast to the flash 
change to the rate of deviation which means the existence of 
anomalies, the gradual and smooth rate of deviation represents an 
indicator of the network stability and this can be utilized to 
represent the safe signal of our prototype. 
 
2.5  Danger Signal Sensor 
 
According to the DT, danger signal represents the deviation in the 
system performance or behavior. To represent this signal in the 
computer network context, parameters which reflect changes in the 
network behavior should be captured and linked to this signal to 
contribute in the final detection result. The statistical features of the 
network connections can be used to discriminate the anomalies of 
the network behaviors by measuring the deviation between the 
statistical features related to the examined connection and the 
statistical features models extracted from the training dataset. 
Table 2 shows the network statistical features of the danger signal 
vector. There are three categories for these statistical features. The 
first category contains the statistical metrics which are related to 
the current connection and measure its danger level. The second 
and third categories represent statistical metrics which sense the 
danger level of the current connection based on time window and 
connections window. The advantage of these two windows is to 
keep the history of the network statistics of the current connection 
to be used in sensing the danger level of the current connection. 
 
Table 2  The network statistical features of the danger signal vector 
 
Category Features 
Per Connection  Connection duration time 
 Packet Interval Average 
 Packet Interval Variance 
 Number of sent bytes 
 Number of received bytes 
 Number of total bytes 
 Number of sent packets 
 Number of received packets 
 Number of total packets 
 Number of bytes per sent packet 
 Number of bytes per received packet 
 Number of bytes per packet 
 Number of bytes sent-to-received ratio  
 Number of packets sent-to-received ratio 
Time Window  Number of connections which have the same 
source IP address as the current connection in 
the last 60 seconds. 
 Number of connections which have the same 
destination IP address as the current 
connection in the last 60 seconds. 
 Number of connections which have the same 
destination port number as the current 
connection in the last 60 seconds. 
 Number of ICMP packets which have the 
same source IP address as the current 
connection in the last 60 seconds. 
 Number of ICMP packets which have the 
same destination IP address as the current 
connection in the last 60 seconds. 
 
 
2.6  Inflammation Signal Sensor 
 
The role of the inflammation signal is to amplify the effect of the 
other input signals in the sensitive situations, and these sensitive 
situations are not necessary to be intrusions. In the computer 
network context, this effect may be represented by increasing the 
number of concurrent remote admin login connections (telnet and 
ssh connections) to the examined network. Although the increasing 
in the number of concurrent remote admin login connections does 
not necessarily represent an indicator for intrusion existence, it 
gives the notion of the situation sensitivity. 
 
2.7  Signals Processor 
 
In our prototype, the inputs processing function of the DCA is used. 
The input processing function has its different weight values for the 
input signals to produce the three output concentrations Ccsm, 
Ssemi and Cmat which are used to specify the detection result. The 
detection result specifies whether the current examined network 
connection represents an intrusion or not. The weight values of the 
input signals are shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3  The weight values of the input signals 
 
Weight csm semi mat 
PAMPs (P) 2 0 2 
Danger Signals (D) 1 0 1 
Safe Signals (S) 2 3 -3 
 
 
2.8  Alert and Events Logger 
 
If an attack is detected, the alert and events logger component has 
the function of alerting the user of the prototype and reporting the 
attack event and all the necessary information about it. This 
component will issue an alert to the GUI, and it is useful also to log 
this event to the Events log file. The reported information of the 
attack includes the IP address(es) of the attacker, the IP address(es) 
of the victim(s), the attacked service, the time of the attack, and any 
information may be useful for the attack investigation process. 
 
 
3.0  EXPERIMENTAL 
 
To evaluate the prototype, two phases were used: the training phase 
and the monitoring phase. In the training phase, a dataset of the 
network self/normal connections are provided to the prototype to 
be analyzed and modeled by the prototype to build the normal 
profile of the network. Once this phase is finished, the monitoring 
phase was started, where the prototype examined the network 
connections to detect any intrusion in those connections. The 
following sub-sections describe the two phases in details. 
  In the training phase, analyzing and modeling the normal/self 
data of the network is done. This is implemented by loading the 
network connections data from the dump files which were sensed 
from the network needed to be monitored. Next, the operation of 
extracting the feature vectors of the PAMP, danger, safe and 
inflammation signals for each connection in the training data is 
implemented to use these feature vectors in calculating the medium 
vectors and variance vectors of the PAMP, danger, safe and 
inflammation signals. These calculated medium and variance 
vectors represent the model of the network self connections which 
the training data is captured from. After that, these medium and 
variance vectors are saved to the network self connections model 
database to be used in the monitoring phase. 
  In the monitoring phase, the prototype loads the network 
connections needed to be examined. After that, for the examined 
connection, the process of extracting the features vectors of the 
PAMP, danger, safe and inflammation signals is executed. Once 
these features vectors of the input signals are extracted, the 
concentration values of the input signals can be calculated by 
measuring the distance between the feature vectors of the examined 
connection and the feature vectors stored in the database which 
represent the network self connections model database. The 
concentration values of the input signals will be used in the process 
of calculating the output concentrations: Ccsm, Csemi and Cmat 
where Equation 1 is used to get these output concentrations. 
Finally, the output concentrations is used to produce the detection 
result. 
  To evaluate the prototype, a benchmark data set was used. 
DARPA 1999 dataset is the most common and popular network 
dataset which is used as a benchmark in the network intrusion 
detection area. DARPA 1999 dataset consists of millions of 
network connections of five weeks; three weeks are specified for 
the training purpose, and two weeks of labeled network 
connections for the testing purpose. In contrast to the second 
training week which contains intrusion connections, the first and 
third training weeks are attacks-free. So for the purpose of building 
the self/normal network connections profile, the two attacks-free 
weeks were used in the training process to ensure that the extracted 
network self connections model is attacks-free. After finishing the 
training process and building the network self connections model, 
testing the prototype with the data of the two labeled testing weeks 
of DARPA 1999 dataset were implemented. The detection rate and 
the false positive rate of the testing process were calculated using 
the labels provided by the dataset for all the network connections 
of the two testing weeks, where these labels specify whether the 
corresponding connection is an attack or not. As shown in the 
following section, the results of the evaluation proved that the goal 
of minimizing the false positive rate was achieved by comparing 
the results of the evaluation process with the results of the NIDS 
which used the DARPA 1999 dataset. 
 
 
4.0  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
DARPA99 dataset consists of 24 tcpdump files representing the 
network traffic dump of 24 days. These 24 days are divided into 
two groups: the first group is 15 days of the first 3 weeks which 
represents the tcpdump files prepared by DARPA for the training 
purpose, and the second group of 9 days of the last two weeks 
which represents the tcpdump files containing attacks. These 9 files 
were the files tested by our prototype to calculate the detection rate, 
number of false alarms, and the false positive rate of each tcpdump 
file. To simplify the referring to the tested tcpdump files, each file 
is labeled according to the weeks it belongs to. For the 4th week 
and the 5th week specified for the testing purpose, the four days of 
the 4th weeks are labeled as 4-1, 4-3, 4-4 and 4-5 and the five days 
of the 5th week are labeled as 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4 and 5-5. 
  The experiment showed that DT could minimize the number 
of false alarms for all the testing days of DARPA99 intrusion 
detection dataset. By minimizing the number of false alarms, this 
leads to minimize the false positive rate in comparison to the false 
positive rate produced by the NS. 
  Table 4 shows the average values of the false alarms, false 
positive rate of all the days of the two testing weeks. 
 
Table 4  Average of false alarms and FPR of DARPA99 testing days 
 
Day 
False Alarms Average False Positive Rate Average 
NS DT NS DT 
4-1 230.8571429 221.1428571 0.527817043 0.512299784 
4-3 535.625 461.75 0.415053529 0.343738761 
4-4 704.8571429 641.8571429 0.336977914 0.310560868 
4-5 997.6 936 0.70242578 0.661502091 
5-1 1264.571429 1184.571429 0.2647205 0.24780159 
5-2 737.2727273 724.3636364 0.207408443 0.202719821 
5-3 457.2 442.2 0.254477222 0.247715611 
5-4 8738.5 8597.5 0.9767905 0.933367078 
5-5 459.6428571 410.4285714 0.263670194 0.236219551 
 
 
  As shown in Table 4, DT technique produces false positive 
rate values which are less than the false positive rate values 
produced by NS over all the testing days of DARPA99 dataset. To 
make it clearer, Figure 2 shows the DT reduction rate of the false 
positive rate. 
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Figure 2  DT reduction rate of false positive rate 
 
 
  So, based on the experiment, the average of the DT reduction 
rate of False Positive Rate for the DARPA99 dataset is 6.67%. 
  Based on these results, some issues need to be discussed. The 
first issue is the ability of the DT to minimize the false positive rate 
over all the nine testing days in a noticeable manner. This can be 
interpreted by the effective role of the safe signal in smoothing and 
moderating the effect of the PAMP and danger signals. These two 
signals push in the direction of classifying the connections as 
intrusions, whereas the safe connection works in the opposite 
direction toward the safe classification side which leads as a result 
in preventing the prototype from issuing false alarms for safe 
connections. 
  The second issue is that for the low detection rate values, it is 
noted that the false positive rate produced by the DT and NS are 
almost the same. This can be interpreted by the fact that the 
threshold value of the Ccsm which is used to classify the tested 
connection is high for those low detection rate values. And this 
means that the connections classified as intrusion in such 
circumstance has high values of Ccsm which were able to 
overcome that high threshold and classified as intrusions as a result 
of overcoming the threshold. So, in such situations, those 
connections which overcome the high threshold usually represent 
parts of attacks, and hence their safe signal concentration values 
will be very low and this means that the performance of both NS 
and DT technique will be very similar. This can be validated by 
checking the number of false alarms of those low detection rate 
values, where these low detection rates are associated with a small 
number of false alarms which means that most of the connections 
overcome the associated threshold are really parts of attacks. 
  In contrast to the situation of the low intrusion detection rate, 
the DT reduction rate values of the false positive rate produced for 
the high detection rate shows that DT can differentiate between the 
safe and non-safe connections and help to minimize the false 
alarms of that low Ccsm threshold values where the low threshold 
values means that so many connections can easily overcome the 
threshold value and be classified as intrusions. So, for such 
situation, the safe signal concentrations of those connections try to 
reduce the effect of the PAMP and danger signals concentrations, 
and hence that leads to prevent those safe connections from 
overcoming the threshold and stop issuing false alarms for such 
safe connections which can be noted by comparing the difference 
between the number of false alarms of the NS and DT techniques 
for those high intrusion detection rate values. 
 
 
 
 
5.0  CONCLUSION 
 
Intrusion Detection Systems is the last line of defense for any 
organization. Although the other security systems have been 
improved in the last years, there is still a need for the IDS to 
overcome the weakness of the other security systems which may 
become useless as a result of their vulnerabilities or 
misconfiguration. Although the big role of IDS it has in the security 
field, the problem of the false positive rate reduces its full 
advantages and makes the goal of producing low false alarms rate 
a necessity to utilize the performance of this type of security 
systems. Finally, DT is a new direction in the intrusion detection 
field, which can be utilized to overcome the problems caused by its 
former NS technique which was the simple version of the DT 
proposed by the HIS scientists in the past to explain the detection 
mechanism of the Immune System, where NS technique was 
realized later by its simplicity and its incapability to explain the 
complex detection mechanism of the HIS which leaded to propose 
the DT. In this paper, we showed that DT could be used to improve 
the performance of NIDS by minimizing the false positive error 
rate. 
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